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Abstract—The paper looks at the possible role of administrative 
law and regulation in a period of economic crisis when the 
previous systems in place to protect social values have failed 
because their primary interest was in the market. The inter-
systemic perspective highlights the role that regulation can have 
in balancing the needs of the market and those of citizens even in 
a globalized perspective in which must be reconsidered the role of 
administrative cooperation. The specific case of social rights is 
analysed as it can be understood as a cyclic quadrilateral whose 
vertex are represented by sustainability, feasibility, executability 
and capability of being judged and lie in the same circle that is 
the “legal reasonableness”, and the challenges that it has to face 
in a situation of economic crisis magnify the risks, undermining 
the very existence of the binomial titularity/effectivity of the 
rights and the consideration and balance of the fundamental 
values of the system can avoid that the imperfect duties of which 
the state is titular might be at the basis of a dangerous 
dismantling of the idea of the welfare state. 
Keywords: Globalization, competition, market, regulatory 
capitalism, cooperation, social rights 
I. GLOBALIZATION AND COMPETITION BETWEEN LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 
Globalization is a phenomenon that has interested not 
only the economic system, but also the social one (science, 
culture, health, technology, etc.), which have gradually 
characterized themselves, in the light of the guarantee of their 
autonomy, in an independent and often different way from the 
schemes and matrixes of the national states. 
Undoubtedly this is a phenomenon that started in the 
economic and financial area, but it expresses first of all a 
political idea, a political theory rather than an economic one 
(1). Due also to the absence of a clear distinction between the 
subjects operating in the political and economic sphere (2), 
during the years we have witnessed a homogenization of 
language, interpretative schemes, and “sensitiveness to some 
questions and insensitiveness to others” that brought politics 
to adapt itself to the needs expressed, or in a certain sense, 
imposed by the economic system.  
In its simplest meaning globalization implies the 
elimination of all those spatial and temporal constraints 
connected to the conduct of business and human activities. But 
its effects on the regulatory national and international systems 
(including the European one) are evident. Focusing attention 
on the national regulatory systems, it is clear to everyone that 
it has led not only to the elimination of the existing rules, 
through the process of deregulation as it is known, but it has 
given rise to competition among (regulatory and 
administrative) systems that has had a great influence (not 
always positive in terms of guaranteeing fundamental values) 
on the production of the new rules that were supposed to 
substitute the ones considered as limiting for the market. 
In fact, deregulation did not lead only to the elimination of 
pre-existing (state) regulation, but, in some cases, to the issuing 
of longer and more complicated provisions that have expanded 
dramatically the spaces within which the financial and 
economic institutions could operate. As some authors have 
pointed out, the negative consequences can be foreseen not 
only in the abolition of rules, but in the content of those issued 
in place of them or those that have never been issued (3). Rules 
that have not been able to regulate the financial system, or, it 
might be better to say, to protect the social one from the effects 
that the expansion or dominance of the first would have. 
II. COMPETITION AND ITS EFFECTS ON SOCIAL VALUES 
In addition to the influence that the liberal and neo-
liberal political ideas had on the setting of the (new) 
regulatory framework, the effect that competition among 
systems inevitably had has to be taken into account.  
Competition between systems, which is reflected 
necessarily in terms of localization of investments and 
productive structures, conditions the capacity of a nation to 
initiate and favour stable and dynamic processes of economic 
development. This necessarily implies, for the very economic 
and then social survival of the state, an adjustment of the legal 
framework in relation to the interferences/impulses coming 
from globalization imposed, among others, by the necessity to 
hold those human and economic resources which are essential 
for its existence; an adjustment that, for various reasons that 
cannot be analyzed here, did not lead to the rationalization of a 
legal system though the introduction of new rules which 
guaranteed at the same time the competitiveness (in terms of 
efficiency and economic convenience) of the system itself and 
the guarantee of those fundamental values necessarily 
involved. It did not draw any advantage from the impulses that 
came from the competition between systems because the 
political system (including the new Left) in a certain sense 
withdrew from its role of guarantor of the fundamental values 
of society, being “blinded” by the charm of the liberal or neo-
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liberal mythology that under the flags of deregulation and 
globalization not only have the previous rules been abolished 
but longer and more complicated liberalizing ones have been 
introduced. Rules that have substantially allowed any sort of 
behaviour, creating a downwards competition in values, to the 
advantage of the “rights of capital” (4).  
So, if globalization on one side involves the 
elimination of constraints for the development of activities 
outside a single nation, in areas which result (for political, 
legal or economic reasons) as more convenient, guaranteeing 
the freedom of individuals to choose the location that is most 
convenient for their interests/needs, on the other side arise 
numerous questions connected to the abovementioned 
guarantee of fundamental rights, in relation to the prevalence 
of political ideas (such as the liberal one) which taken to the 
extreme give less (if any) space to fundamental (social) rights, 
and to competition among (legal and administrative) systems 
which naturally arises from this. 
In other terms, if, on one hand, it promotes the 
freedom of movement of individuals (and businesses) 
allowing them to choose the legal and administrative system in 
which to operate, on the other, different issues arise connected 
to the organizational needs of the systems themselves and to 
the consequences that the changes in the organization and 
regulation (often aimed at guaranteeing a higher attractiveness 
of the system) have on the social sphere (e.g. the 
consequences on the guarantees of workers, on the systems of 
social protection, on social rights). 
And in this sense it is sufficient to recall the human 
and social effects of the present crisis, which undoubtedly has 
solid structural, economic and mainly political foundations, 
whose origins have been detected considering different 
variables moving from so-called debtonation (5), to the 
pathological development of global finance; to the regulation 
of financial markets and their players; to the internal dynamics 
of financial capitalism, its systemic fragility, and the distortion 
that it imposes on the real economy; creating economic 
inequalities.   
And it is precisely the consideration of the social impact of 
the crisis that requires a shift in the focus on to the attempt to 
bring everything within the framework of “constitutionalism” 
and, as suggested by Julia Black (6), the “rule of law doctrine”, 
in order to limit the exercise of the legislative power first, and 
the executive one then, “by reference to higher norm and 
principles, in the light of a democratic governance”. 
III. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE ADEQUACY OF THE 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The passage to the regulatory state, which 
summarizes the changes in the nature of state intervention 
represented a challenge to the traditional conception of the 
centrality of the very notion of state on the one hand, and for 
the guarantee of fundamental rights and democracy on the 
other. A guarantee that is more difficult to ensure in a situation 
of economic crisis like the one systems are going through in 
which the needs of globalized systems are barely reconciled 
with those of social systems. 
The failure of (market) regulation, as much as the 
failure of (state) regulation, gave new life to the debate on the 
role of the state in the economic system, making the issue of 
the adequacy of the regulatory framework in order to meet the 
needs of the economic and social systems more urgent. And it 
is the “crisis” that recalls Zeno’s Paradox of Achilles and the 
tortoise where the latter, thanks to the head start it gets, will 
never be overtaken by Achilles – if not by using the concept of 
infinity, with Achilles requiring an infinite time to travel 
through the infinite points that separate him from the tortoise. 
The reference to the adequacy of the regulatory 
framework leads us to reflect on the relationship between state 
and economy and mainly on the contents of the legal rules, on 
the areas that it must intercept, moving from those aspects of 
weakness of the liberal paradigm that the economic crisis has 
shown and that have definitively debunked the “myth of the 
self-correction and self-regulation” of the market, showing the 
negative effects that its failures, and more in general the 
failure of regulation, had not only within the economic system 
but also in the social sphere. 
And it is precisely the consideration of the social 
effects of the crisis which show the impossibility of 
considering the market exclusively in its narrower meaning 
referred only to its economic principle (of competition) on 
which it is based, a principle chosen in the political scenario, 
but it has to be considered in a wider sense, including other 
values (in addition to the mere economic one) such as the one 
of its stability, in a perspective that highlights the 
interrelations with the other (sub)systems, in particular the 
social one. From this perspective the first issue that arises is 
related to the adequacy of the regulatory framework. 
The demolition of the myth of the viability of the 
market is certainly not without consequences.  The first, and 
most evident, one is related to the necessity to set a legal and 
regulatory framework that responds to the needs of the market, 
in the wide meaning mentioned above, granting not only the 
respect of the economic principle, and therefore its 
(proper/correct) functioning according to this principle, but 
also its stability and more in general its compatibility with the 
general principles on which society is based. 
From this perspective it is clear that the “norm”, the 
rule, does not have an adaptive/conformative (to the market) 
value, a negative value, according to liberal theories. It cannot 
be treated as one of the imbalances that affect the 
competitiveness of the market, stifling the (economic) 
principle on which it is based, because the rule does not 
impose a different principle, it does not establish principles 
that are not in accordance with it. In other words the provision 
is just one element, one of the prerequisites of value, as well 
as the factual one, that the individual operator must take into 
account in order to make a rational choice; a simple 
assumption of individual behaviour. Therefore, not a denial of 
freedom of competition, the lack of which has been interpreted 
as an element that ends up affecting the same ethics of the 
market, in favour of particular interests of certain categories, 
imposing on the market an (economic) principle that is 
different to its “natural” one. The rule is neutral in itself, and 
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for this reason it can only have a technical content, to ensure 
the operation and compliance with the principle and values 
which characterize the system itself. In other words, given the 
option for the competitive model, the rule aims to solve a 
problem that is purely technical: “issue norms, establish 
bodies, provide criteria for the application and integration that 
are the most suitable to avoid any distortion or alteration of the 
economic reality considered” (7). In this perspective, 
therefore, state regulation is functional to the existence and the 
proper functioning of the regulated system, and in fact it does 
not denature its own features (in this case its being 
competitive).  
 It is clear, then, it is not the norm in itself that 
assumes a positive or negative value with respect to the 
competitive market, but the political choice that it expresses. 
And the choice not to provide rules for those who operate in a 
certain market can have purposes other than the simple 
compliance with the principle of competition and the belief in 
the ability of the market to regulate itself. 
IV. FROM REGULATION FOR COMPETITIVENESS TO 
REGULATION FOR THE MARKET 
In the light of the abovementioned observations the 
next step has to be referred to the consideration of the extent 
of state regulation. 
In pondering the possible contents of the norm, it 
cannot be ignored that once a certain economic model has 
been chosen at a political level, the legal system has a triple 
task. The first is to provide a regulatory framework that, in 
application of the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity, 
guarantees the realization and operation of the economic 
system in itself, through a regulation that orders and 
coordinates activities, and structures and solves conflicts. The 
second is to  guarantee its adaptation to the interference 
(which expresses need) from the social system, functioning as 
a guarantor of respect for those fundamental values which are 
the natural and intrinsic limit for the choice of the economic 
model. And it is from the point of view of the intimate 
interconnection between social, legal and economic 
subsystems that the third task of the legal system emerges, 
also in a globalized perspective, that of guaranteeing the 
application of the democratic principle, in relation to the 
principle of constitutionalism and the rule of law.  
And this is because the relationship between law and 
economics places itself in a position of mutual inter-systemic 
relations which affect each other, so that the political system 
takes the stresses from the non-legal pole and transforms them 
into rules which will have their effects on the economic and 
social systems. Relations whose limit has to be found in the 
invariance of the organization or, more correctly, of those 
values around which the organization is built, that is, those 
characters and those networks of relations that determine the 
identity of the system itself. Relationships that, with reference 
to the Western countries, are declined in the constitutional 
moment, and more precisely in the invariable part of the 
constitution, and that outside of national experiences may well 
be traced in the international charters in which fundamental 
rights are provided. 
In this sense “Die Systementsheidung”, the global 
decision on the system cannot be separated from the 
realization and guarantee of that catalogue of rights and values 
that form the core of the political constitution. So a global 
decision that cannot ignore the individual, who, in accordance 
with the individualist neo-liberal theory, is seen as a free 
agent, but free to move and act according to the rules of 
private law, exercising his/her freedom in accordance with the 
overall decision. 
The intervention of the state, therefore, must be 
functional to the competitiveness of the market, but at the 
same time it must be functional to the market considered as a 
whole and therefore must be realized through the introduction 
of external elements that ensure a balance also with elements 
of social policy in relation to which the state (or the public 
body) is the sole guarantor and at the same time limit those 
effects, particularly evident in relation to globalization, which 
leads to the construction of unequal citizenship in relation to 
the possession of means (not only economic) sufficient to 
ensure access to different and more convenient systems. 
In other words, there should not be a separation 
between the economic and the social pole, the legal system 
having the duty to realize in itself the social order as well as 
the economic one, basing them on values that are implemented 
by the democratic state and expressed in the economic 
constitution, considered as the global decision on the 
organization of the economic life of a community. So, the role 
of the state, and of any public body, even supranational or 
international, in the economy should be the result of the 
interaction between non-economic value, judgments between 
citizens, consumer preferences between public and private 
goods, business decisions on resources allocation and growth, 
and the idea of a fair distribution of income between the 
owners of the means of production, on the one hand, and the 
system of power relations within the public sector on the other 
(8). 
In this sense, therefore, the regulatory choice 
becomes, from a finalistic point of view, compatible with the 
choice of the competitive market, as it is structured in 
accordance with the binary (revenue/costs) system of the 
economic sector, the public regulation being in line with the 
choice of an economic model based on competition, and in 
accordance with the characteristics of the social system. 
V. THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
In the light of the abovementioned observations the 
next step has to be referred to the consideration of the extent 
of state regulation. 
And it is precisely on this point that, with regard to 
the economic crisis, the discourse on the role of the public 
sector is more pressing. 
The point of reference must be identified in the 
meaning of the expression “proper and efficient operation of 
the system”. It is clear, in fact, that if a perspective 
coordinated with the framework of fundamental values is 
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assumed, it is not possible to ignore, or rather not to include, 
those profiles more closely related to the stability of the 
system, extended to the protection of its investors/users. 
And therefore, if the economic organization is based 
on the principle of competition, the possible (public) 
interventions on the market will move within a wide range that 
goes from a substantial non-intervention (where the conditions 
for perfect competition are fully realized) to a more or less 
consistent intervention, which can get, as today's reality 
shows, to the point of verifying the non-toxicity of financial 
products on the market. And it is on the latter aspect that 
market failures are more evident. 
But here another question arises. How law, and with 
reference to the Italian system, administrative law in 
particular, through which these interventions are realized, is 
functionalized, or rather, in order to be legitimate and 
compatible with the chosen market organization, what form 
should (public) action take, and after this, which (public) 
interests should be pursued. 
The delicate issue of the public interest as the basis 
for regulatory choice is intercepted, an interest that, in the 
light of the above, is functional not only for the market 
system, but more generally for its stability declined in the 
social context; a complex interest that includes the interest in 
the respect of the rules of the game, but that inevitably has 
many other facets: the interest in the promotion and support of 
economic freedom, meant from a systemic perspective as 
freedom of competition in the logic of the construction of 
trade relations between free and equal persons; an interest to 
which reasons of social utility, or general utility or social 
purposes cannot be extraneous, as well as the protection of 
freedom, security and human dignity, that is, that set of values 
that can be traced back to the invariable part of the 
constitution that act, together with the others, as a limit for the 
(political) choice not only of the economic model but of the 
contents themselves of the regulatory framework. 
Therefore, not only an interest that the specific sector 
is regulated in accordance with a general principle, but that in 
it is ensured the operation of principles and values in relation 
to which the administration is in a position of neutrality. 
An interest in the proper functioning whose indirect 
effect is the guarantee of the freedom of all the subjects 
(individual and legal) of the system. In other words, the public 
interest, because of its nature, does not disappear, but, on the 
contrary, it becomes complementary to and competitive with 
the other sources of regulation that the system generates and 
maintains as active, placing itself as the centre for the 
emission of principles and binding decisions according to the 
rules of public and administrative law. Therefore, the public 
interest, far from putting itself outside the sector, like a 
snarling guard dog, is located in it, through the instruments of 
legislation and administration, in order to develop its 
constructive and reconstructive parts, in an unending process 
of monitoring and control, guarantee and protection.  
  
VI. REGULATORY CAPITALISM AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
COOPERATION. 
It cannot be denied, in fact, that the particular 
economic situation that has arisen at the end of the first decade 
of the new century brought an appreciable reconsideration of 
regulation, considered as regulation for the market. A 
reconsideration whose starting point must be brought back, as 
said before, to the evolution of the system and, more 
particularly, to the failures of the regulatory system based 
primarily on a system of controls made by the regulatory 
authorities on the actors operating on the national and global 
market, that, in line with the prevalence of liberal teachings, 
stood on ex post forms of control of the activities of these 
actors, thus confining the scope of intervention of the 
regulator to two moments: the establishment of the rules, 
essentially strictly limited to the economic aspect, and the 
guarantees of their compliance, pursued essentially through an 
activity of control following the course of action, possibly 
confluent in enforcement proceedings. And in this way have, 
thus, been neglected, in the name of free enterprise and 
competition, the many facets of the wide and complex concept 
of vigilance, that, and the reality in which we live 
demonstrates it, are essential for the guarantee not only of the 
competitiveness of the market but also of its own and social 
stability as well. 
Therefore, a control (vigilance) for the market that 
provides a structure allowing its operation and its 
compatibility with the social system at the same time, and this 
since the market (which is also an economic fact) cannot be 
meant as a more or less abstract self-regulating entity, but 
rather as an entity that is only partly non-juridical and that 
requires, for its functioning, a legal status that necessarily has 
to be traced to a system of heteronymous rules, provided by 
the legal system and an adequate institutional system as well 
with respect to which the (public) institutions play a central 
role. And on this point we should recall the words of Galbraith 
(9) who affirmed that the public authorities play a role in the 
market system that even more complex. Competition, when it 
exists, inspires feeling of ambiguity, a deep attachment to the 
principle of the market, but the refusal to suffer imperatives. 
And to alleviate the pain, government intervenes to help even 
when oligopolies have trouble maintaining their 
competitiveness. State intervention, although in abstract it can 
be traced back to the concept of coercion, in fact is a necessary 
evil that, if not properly calibrated, can very easily turn into a 
factor of abuse of competition. 
It is with reference to these profiles that those 
imbalances, due to the influence of the liberal theories, led to 
that downward competition between systems, as observed 
earlier. 
In this framework the state (the national public 
authorities) becomes only one of the possible actors in a wider 
system of rules, applied by the administrations and guaranteed 
by courts, in which the relations between state, market and 
other non-state actors are re-modelled from the perspective of 
the construction of a legal area, significantly defined as 
regulatory capitalism (10), which is characterized not only 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.2 No.4, July 2013
113 © 2013 GSTF
from the point of view of the rules (mainly the administrative 
rules which bring to a growth rather than a reduction of 
regulation) but also from a subjective point of view, and that 
can represent the instrument through which is guaranteed that 
system of safeguards, and the same competitiveness of a 
healthy system that uncontrolled deregulation had 
substantially destroyed.   
 
VII. THE CASE OF SOCIAL RIGTHS. 
The abovementioned elements are particularly 
relevant with reference to social rights whose  
contextualisation in the framework of globalization and the 
economic crisis stresses moments of great uncertainty on the 
basis of which some legal scholars have written about the 
death of socio-economic rights (11). 
The complex of challenges that globalization poses 
for these rights, from the perspective of their substantial 
profile (the one connected with the positive action that the 
public subject has to make in order to guarantee the service 
that gives consistence to the right) risks undermining the very 
existence of the binomial titularity/effectivity of the rights that 
characterises pluralist democracies: the first connected to the 
profile of the resources available for the realisation of those 
interventions aimed to give the due consistency to the 
aforementioned rights that, recalling a formula that has been 
understandably criticised, but that is unfortunately actual, are 
financially conditioned; the second concerns the profile of the 
(public) organisation responsible for the material offering of 
the services, essential for the satisfaction of these rights. 
On this point it is sufficient to recall the negative 
consequences to which the Welfare State has been exposed 
because of the decrease of sovereignty of the national states in 
the economic sector, and deriving from the political-
institutional vacuum following the handing over of 
sovereignty to the European institutions, and therefore to the 
absence of a capacity of the institutional system to regulate the 
productive and distributive processes aimed at the growth of a 
lot of economies as well as the degree of inequalities within 
the systems. 
With reference to the Italian experience, it is 
interesting to focus the attention on the consequences deriving 
from the unfinished constitutional transition that has further 
fractured the framework of the institutional reference points, 
undermining irremediably what should be an integrated 
approach to the problem of disability  and more in general of 
social disadvantage because of the undeniable unity and 
inseparability of needs. 
The attempt to realize a resettlement of competences, 
in the perspective of the construction of a system that from 
devolution should have gone towards a federalist model 
following a stronger application of the principle of subsidiarity 
intended also in its vertical extension referred to the 
participation of private entities in the market of services, had a 
counter effect on the attempt at the rationalisation of the 
system ensured by the vicinity of the provider and the 
beneficiary of the service. In fact, it provoked the 
multiplication of the referring centres and of the regulation, 
because of the fractioning of competences, that ended up 
undermining the very effectiveness that was being pursued.  A 
fractioning that is contrary to the direction indicated by the 
European Union in the Resolution of the Parliament of 
February 2009 on social economy that stresses the importance 
of the promotion of networks of solidarity for the guarantee of 
social rights, hoping for a stricter collaboration between public 
and private entities. 
In addition to the problems considered, the situation 
is more complex if we move our attention on to the profile of 
the balance with other public needs, among which is that of 
the budgetary balance, that as a matter of fact has been moved 
outside the political-institutional spheres, to became reserved 
to the bureaucratic ones. 
The consideration of these profiles opens up a 
different panorama for studies represented by the 
sustainability of these rights that  cannot be separated from the 
consideration of those aspects connected with the due 
reduction of internal public debt whose redistributive function 
intercepts necessarily the services provided to the collectivity 
and that are coessential with respect to the satisfaction of 
fundamental rights unless the guarantee is not meant just in 
principle. 
And it is in this context - in which the complete and 
effective guarantee of social rights must face the multilevel 
guarantee, typical of what has been defined in terms of social 
federalism, and the increasing scarcity of resources – the 
specification at a central level of the essential level of those 
performances concerning civil and social rights has a 
fundamental importance in order to guarantee the substantial 
homogeneity of the conditions of life and the socio-economic 
cohesion as an expression of the principles of equality, 
fairness and unity. 
The relevance of these aspects emerges more 
evidently in a context characterised from the passage, common 
to the majority of the systems, from a logic of public 
performance to a logic of integration between public and 
private, synthesised in the formula of circular subsidiarity. 
In this perspective the regulatory instrument, and 
therefore administrative cooperation, could assume a role of 
primary importance in the perspective of the realization of 
what Margalit (12)  defines in terms of “decent society”, that 
is a society that does not humiliate its members offending their 
dignity, that does not allow the “excluded” to receive the 
paternalism of the state or the pity of the institutions. 
The abovementioned situation can be represented, 
from a figurative point of view, as a cyclic quadrilateral whose 
vertices – that in our case are the sustainability, feasibility, 
executability and capability of being judged – lies in the same 
circle that is the “legal reasonableness”, identified in a 
systemic perspective, and as a result of that dynamic 
interactive operation, of Haberlesque memory, that is of a 
balance of value that, necessarily, cannot exclude the 
consideration of the economic aspects, as well. 
With respect to the Italian experience, the evolution 
of the decisions of the Constitutional Court in the matter is 
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very significant. In fact, it shows clearly how with the passage 
from the abstract provision to the concrete guarantee of these 
rights the abovementioned cyclic quadrilateral must be taken 
into consideration, with a central role for the profile of 
economic sustainability, on which the feasibility depends 
(referred essentially to the provision at a legislative level of 
the service, based on the consideration also of the economic 
profiles, from which depends the exercise by the individuals 
of their rights and therefore the possibility to bring a case in 
front of a judge. 
In fact the starting phase of guarantee, characterised 
by the so-called decisions aimed at adding the duty to give a 
certain service enlarging the categories of the beneficiaries of 
the single performance provided by law, followed a sort of 
step backward in the guarantee which therefore found a limit 
represented by the full guarantee of fundamental rights.  
So, in evaluating the constitutionality of a legislative 
provision which for economic reasons limited the right of a 
disabled person to primary education, the Court stated that it 
was in contrast with the constitution (Art. 3 and Art. 34) 
because the reduction would cause “The lack of one of the 
factors which would favour the development of the 
personality” and moreover it could “risk to stop [it] if not to 
cause a regression”. Making an appreciable balance between 
the constitutional values it stated the unconstitutionality of the 
provision, being based on an improper evaluation of capacity 
and merit.  
In line with this interpretation a limit has been 
identified on the discretion of the legislator represented by the 
provision of the indefeasible nucleus of guarantees which 
permit a complete satisfaction to the right. So, again, in 
relation to the right to education, but referring to a legislative 
provision which reduced the numbers of hours of support 
teaching despite the degree of disability of the student, it has 
been stated that the “organisation of support teaching by the 
schools cannot ... compress or breach that right recognised to 
the individual by the Constitution... and support teaching must 
be provided in a substantial way, that is with interventions that 
are adequate to the degree of disability”.  
In this perspective, if the principle of equality from 
the beginning represented the turning point for the 
development of social rights, the fact that they are financially 
(economically) conditioned cannot bring to postulate their 
inexistence. The fact that the state has an imperfect duty 
cannot represent an element that brings to the denial of the 
same right but at the most it is an element that, as Sen (13) 
would stress, leads the way to a fecund public debate and 
eventually to a proper pressure.  
Going back to the example of the cyclic quadrilateral, 
the reference to the balance among values shows the 
impossibility for the economic burdens to cause a complete 
dismantling of the Welfare State, and therefore the denial of 
social rights, but they should lead to a remodelling of the 
structures that characterise it. Otherwise the worse Kelsen 
would win, that according to which all the vices of a law 
would be just formal so the politicians of the day would 
simply need a majority to do as they like.      
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